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VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism
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#	Item
31	Modularity and Greed in Double Auctions ¨ PAUL DUTTING , Stanford University TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Stanford University Add to Reading List Source URL: paulduetting.com Language: English - Date: 2014-04-24 00:51:07 Auction theory Game theory Auctions Mechanism design Decision theory Gaming Double auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Auction Deferred-acceptance auction Eauction Incentive compatibility
32	CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #3: The Crawford-Knoer Auction∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 15, Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2014-01-21 00:57:01 Auction theory Auctions Mechanism design Game theory VickreyClarkeGroves auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Auction English auction Revelation principle Competitive equilibrium Vickrey auction
33	On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions Qiqi Yan? Department of Computer Science, Stanford University Abstract. We study the frugality ratio of truthful mechanisms in path Add to Reading List Source URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com Language: English - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:36 Mechanism design Game theory Social choice theory VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism
34	Learning About The Future and Dynamic E¢ ciency Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu1We Add to Reading List Source URL: pluto.huji.ac.il Language: English - Date: 2014-02-02 05:15:06 Mechanism design VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Economics Principalagent problem
35	Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms David C. Parkes Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 33 Oxford Street, Cambridge MA 02138 Add to Reading List Source URL: www.eecs.harvard.edu Language: English Game theory Mechanism design Distributed algorithmic mechanism design VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Strategyproofness Revelation principle Vickrey auction Agent-based model Incentive compatibility Algorithm VickreyClarkeGroves auction Multi-agent system
36	A Truthful-in-expectation Mechanism for the Generalized Assignment Problem Salman Fadaei and Martin Bichler Department of Informatics, TU München, Munich, Germany , Add to Reading List Source URL: dss.in.tum.de Language: English - Date: 2015-07-06 06:27:57 Game theory Convex optimization Linear programming Operations research Mechanism design Expected value VickreyClarkeGroves auction Submodular set function
37	Strategyproof Mechanisms for Ad Hoc Network Formation C. Jason Woodard∗ David C. Parkes† Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MAMay 21, 2003 Add to Reading List Source URL: netecon.seas.harvard.edu Language: English - Date: 2009-11-30 14:32:04 Game theory Mechanism design Strategyproofness VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Distributed algorithmic mechanism design Double auction Incentive compatibility VickreyClarkeGroves auction Algorithmic mechanism design Network formation Mathematical optimization
38	Envy, Truth, and Profit ∗ Jason D. Hartline Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Add to Reading List Source URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com Language: English - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:34 Mechanism design Game theory Auction theory Auctions Sampling Bayesian-optimal mechanism Prior-free mechanism VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Prior-independent mechanism Virtual valuation Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction
39	In Proc. 17th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-01), ppAchieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges David C. Parkes Add to Reading List Source URL: www.eecs.harvard.edu Language: English - Date: 2010-03-16 10:11:46 Game theory Auction theory Auctions Mechanism design Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction Auction Double auction Discounting Strategyproofness Payment VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism
40	Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions Paul D¨ utting1,? , Monika Henzinger2,?? , and Martin Starnberger2,?? 1 Add to Reading List Source URL: paulduetting.com Language: English - Date: 2013-09-29 17:50:14 Mechanism design Game theory Auction theory Auctions Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction First-price sealed-bid auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Valuation Revelation principle